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Luca Barlassina1 & Max Khan Hayward2 
 
Loopy regulations:  
The motivational profile of affective phenomenology 





Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective 
phenomenology: they feel (un)pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a 
loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these 
actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For 
example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you 
to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant 
gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism 
(Barlassina & Hayward 2019) is the only intentionalist account of affective 
phenomenology—probably, the only account at all—that is able to make 
sense of its loopy regulatory profile.  
 
 
1. Bentham’s dictum 
In perhaps the most famous passage ever written by a philosopher on the nature of pleasant 
and unpleasant experiences, Jeremy Bentham claimed that: 
 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain, and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine 
what we shall do. [Bentham 1789/1970, p.11] 
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Bentham’s dictum is confronting, because it mixes an observation that is obviously correct with 
claims that are contestable at best. For it is undeniable that we undergo pleasant and unpleasant 
experiences and that their (un)pleasantness plays a role in governing our behaviour. As we 
might say in more contemporary terminology, it plays a regulatory role. But it is dubious that it 
does anything so clean cut as determining our behaviour; more dubious still is the normative claim 
that pleasure and displeasure reliably indicate or ground facts about what we ought to do. 
 In fact, even the uncontroversial bit of Bentham’s dictum raises difficult questions. Why 
are there such experiences? And how do they regulate what we do? These are the questions that 
will keep us busy in this article. So, it’d be better getting clear on them. Some examples will 
help. 
 
1.1 Three questions about pleasure and displeasure 
Abe is eating a brownie. His gustatory experience feels pleasant. He thus keeps eating. And so 
he gets more gustatory pleasure. Zoe sprained her right ankle. Her experience feels unpleasant. 
So she takes a painkiller. Her unpleasant pain goes away.  
These trivial stories highlight three important psychological facts. First, there are experiences 
that feel good or pleasant, as well as experiences that feel bad or unpleasant. Sensory pleasures and 
pains are cases in point. But the class of these experiences extends far beyond sensory pleasures 
and pains. It’s easy to find examples: joy, happiness, elation on the pleasant side, and nausea, 
sadness, misery on the unpleasant one. Let us call these (un)pleasant experiences ‘affective 
experiences’ and call an experience’s feeling pleasant/good or unpleasant/bad ‘affective 
phenomenology’. Affective experiences thus contrast with affectively-neutral experiences, 
which feel neither pleasant nor unpleasant. (Here is an instance of the latter category: the visual 
experience as of a pen next to your laptop. It does not feel good or bad. At least, our visual 
experience does not feel good or bad. You might be different. In that case, think of a different 
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experience which does not feel good or bad. That is an affectively-neutral experience.) Hence 
our first question: in virtue of what do some experiences have affective phenomenology? Or, 
which amounts to the same thing, what makes it the case that some experiences, but not others, 
feel pleasant or unpleasant? 
In the grip of affective experiences, we typically do things. Abe kept eating his brownie; 
Zoe took a painkiller. It is not accidental that Abe and Zoe did this. It is exactly because their 
experiences had affective phenomenology—because they felt good or bad—that they were 
motivated to act like that. If eating the brownie hadn’t been pleasant, Abe wouldn’t have kept 
eating it (other things being equal). If the pain in Zoe’s ankle hadn’t been unpleasant, she would 
have probably left the painkillers in her purse. The affective phenomenology of our experiences 
has a role in regulating our actions. This second psychological fact gives rise to our second question: 
in virtue what of does affective phenomenology motivate us to act a certain way? 
And here is the third fact. The actions we perform guided by the (un)pleasantness of 
our experiences typically end up affecting these very affective experiences. Motivated by the 
pleasantness of his gustatory experience, Abe kept eating the brownie. Result: more gustatory 
pleasure. Motivated by the unpleasantness of her pain, Zoe took a painkiller. Result: less 
unpleasant pain. Just as much as our affective phenomenology plays a role in regulating our 
actions, so the actions that we are motivated to perform under the sway of our affective 
phenomenology in turn regulate our affective experiences. Affective phenomenology has a loopy 
regulatory profile: we undergo affective experiences; their affective phenomenology motivates us 
to perform actions; these actions either inhibit (for unpleasant experiences) or promote (for 
pleasant experiences) further affective experiences. What explains this loop? This is our third 
and final question.  




(1) In virtue of what do affective experiences have affective phenomenology? — I.e., in 
virtue of what do they feel pleasant/good or unpleasant/bad? 
 
(2) In virtue of what does affective phenomenology regulate us? — I.e., in virtue of what 
does it typically motivate us to act a certain way? 
 
(3) In virtue of what does affective phenomenology have a loopy regulatory profile? —  I.e., 
in virtue of what do the very actions motivated by the affective phenomenology of our 
experiences typically end up regulating our affective experiences back? 
 
Any adequate theory of affective phenomenology should be able to answer (1)-(3). But, in this 
article, we focus our attention on a particular family of theories of affective phenomenology: 
intentionalist theories. You might want to know the reason for this focus. That’s a fair request and 
we shall accommodate this shortly. Before doing that, however, a clarification is in order.  
 
1.2 Mind vs normativity 
Bentham, although not always given to philosophical subtlety, is careful to distinguish, in his 
dictum, between a descriptive claim (“Pain and pleasure determine what we shall do”) and a 
normative one (“They determine what we ought to do”). Surprisingly enough, the contemporary 
literature on affective phenomenology often fails to draw this basic distinction. People start by 
saying that affective experiences feel good or bad and move seamlessly to the assertion that such 
experiences are good or bad for us. For example, David Bain claims that any theory of pain’s 
unpleasantness must respect the following Normative Condition: “being in unpleasant pain could 
consist in being in state φ only if being in state φ is, in the relevant cases, non-instrumentally 
bad for its subject” (Bain 2019, p. 463). 
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We take it that the badness that Bain has in mind is prudential badness. Now, it might be 
true that unpleasant experiences are always non-instrumentally, prudentially bad for their 
subjects and that, mutatis mutandis, pleasant experiences are always non-instrumentally, 
prudentially good for their subjects. But this is a contested claim. Nietzsche (see Anderson 
2017), as well as certain religious thinkers, appear to deny that unpleasantness is always non-
instrumentally bad for us; and Moore (1903/1922, pp. 209-10) argued that cruel or ugly 
pleasures are not even prudentially good. Be that as it may, the point we want to make here is 
that it is a job for ethics, not the philosophy of mind, to make any determination about the 
prudential value of pleasure and displeasure. And the present article is an article in the philosophy 
of mind. Thus, question (1) should be read as asking why affective experiences feel good/bad, not 
why (or whether) they are good/bad.  
Similarly, you can find philosophers who, exactly like us, want to explain how affective 
phenomenology achieves the regulation of our actions—how it motivates us to act a certain 
way—but then end up asking why it gives us reasons to do this. Of course, if by ‘reasons’ one just 
means ‘motivating reasons’, then we have no problem with this. Indeed, there is an even further 
sense of ‘reasons’ such that one can interpret our question (2) in terms of reasons. Not only do 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences motivate action. It is also the case that the actions 
performed in the light of affective phenomenology seem to “make sense”, or be intelligible, and 
so affective phenomenology may be said to provide reasons in a broadly Davidsonian sense 
(Davidson 2001). For example, it is entirely unsurprising that Abe kept on eating his brownie 
since that gave him pleasure.  
But to say that actions performed in the light of pleasantness or unpleasantness are 
rational, in the sense of being intelligible, is not the same as to say that they are (pro tanto) rationally 
required, in the sense that we ought to perform them. Accordingly, we maintain that a theory of 
affective phenomenology in the philosophy of mind needs to explain how (un)pleasantness motivates 
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behaviour, and, moreover, why it is that these motivations appear to make sense; but we deny 
that such a theory needs to stray into the realm of full-blooded normativity. In this sense, 
question (2) asks why affective phenomenology provides intelligible, motivating reasons, not why it 
provides normative reasons (if it does at all).  
 
1.3 Unintelligible Desires  
‘Intentionalism’ (Byrne 2001; Dretske 1995; Tye 1995a) is the name for a family of theories 
that attempt to explain the phenomenology of an experience (including its affective 
phenomenology) in terms of the experience’s intentional content—more on this later on. This 
article attempts to establish which version of intentionalism (if any) best answers (1)-(3). ‘Why 
do you focus on intentionalism?’, you asked us before. We can now answer your question.  
 The most prominent alternative to intentionalism is the desire theory (Heathwood 
2007). On the face of it, this theory seems to offer an elegant and unified answer to (1)-(3). Why 
does Abe’s gustatory experience feel pleasant? Because Abe is desiring to have such an 
experience while he is having it. And why does such a pleasant experience motivate Abe to eat 
more of the brownie? Because Abe thinks that, by acting in that way, he will get more of the 
experience that he desires. And why will such an action end up generating more pleasure in 
Abe? Because Abe will then desire the experience he is having.  
Nice story, isn’t it? Not really, we say. As we stated above, even though a theory of 
affective phenomenology in the philosophy of mind is not required to explain why (or whether) 
affective phenomenology gives us normative reasons, it must explain why such a phenomenology 
gives us intelligible, motivating reasons. In this regard, the desire theory is a non-starter. Why does 
Abe desire the gustatory experience he is having? The desire theorist cannot say that he desires 
it because it feels pleasant, since she claims that the reverse is true: it feels pleasant because Abe 
desires it. So, why does he desire it? The desire theory is in principle incapable of answering this 
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question, since it takes this desire to be primitive: Abe doesn’t desire his gustatory experience 
because it has this or that intrinsic feature; it just so happens that Abe desires it. End of story. 
We find this account unsatisfactory. It doesn’t seem true that Abe merely happens to desire 
his gustatory experience, or that Zoe merely happens to dislike her pain sensation—that they 
might just as easily have ended up reversing their attitudes. At least at the first-personal level, 
it appears that we have pro-/con- attitudes towards our experiences because they feel pleasant/ 
unpleasant. But of course, we do not want to leave the story here either—our goal is to explain 
subjective experience in terms of something else. So that something else must be something 
which can also stand in this sort of rationalising relationship to our attitudes.  
The most likely candidate—maybe the only candidate—is affective experiences’ 
intentional content. What else could in fact “rationalise” our response to such experiences? It 
might well be that affective experiences share certain neural properties, but it is hard to see how 
these properties can feature into a reason-giving explanation; such properties can cause our 
behaviours and attitudes, but they do not seem able to make sense of them. Other philosophers 
appeal to ineffable qualia (Bramble 2013). But it is unclear how qualia can play a reason-giving 
role either. To see why this is the case, it is helpful to consider perceptual cases. In response to 
the question ‘Why did you act as though that stick was straight?’, it seems inapt to respond 
‘Because I was in brain state C’ or ‘Because I was experiencing quale No5’. We make ourselves 
intelligible to our questioner only by responding ‘Because it looked straight’. This is because 
the explanation called for occurs at the semantic-intentional level (Fodor 1987).  
We think the same considerations apply to affective states too. This is why, in this article, 
we investigate whether intentionalism can offer an adequate account of affective 
phenomenology. If intentionalism fails, it becomes unclear whether the role of affective 




2. Intentionalism about affective phenomenology 
Unless you have spent too much time in Oxford, you probably believe that many experiences 
have intentional content. For example, a visual experience as of a red car has an intentional 
content roughly like this: There is a red car in front of me. And unless you are Keith Frankish, you 
also believe that experiences have phenomenology—there is something it is like to have them.3 
For example, there is something it is like for you to have a visual experience as of a red car, and 
this something-it-is-like differs from the phenomenology of, say, a visual experience as of a blue 
car.  
What’s the relation between the phenomenology and the intentional content of an 
experience? Intentionalism says that the former depends on, or even reduces to, the latter. So, 
the phenomenology of your ‘red car experience’ differs from the phenomenology of your ‘blue 
car experience’ because these two experiences have different intentional contents.  
In the last three decades, intentionalism has proven immensely popular among 
philosophers of mind. One reason for its success is that, as we said in the previous section, 
intentionalism promises to “rationalise” the role of phenomenology in cognition. Why did you 
form the belief There is a red car in front of me in response to a visual experience with such-and-
such a phenomenology? Because this phenomenology was nothing over-and-above the content 
There is a car in front of me. In addition, intentionalism paves the way to solving the hard-problem 
of consciousness (Chalmers 1995). It is not easy to find a place for phenomenology in the natural 
world. But if intentionalism is right and phenomenology is grounded in intentional content, 
then one only needs to naturalise the latter to naturalise the former.  
 
3 If you are Dan Dennett, you don’t believe either of these claims. This is because you spent too much 
time in Oxford and with Keith Frankish.  
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But there’s a catch. While intentionalists tend to agree on how an account of visual, 
auditory, or bodily phenomenology should work, disagreement about the proper treatment of 
affective phenomenology looms large. What is it that intentionalists disagree about? 
 
2.1 Evaluativism vs imperativism 
The standard story sees the greatest dividing line in the intentionalist camp as that which 
separates evaluativism from imperativism. Needless to say, both theories claim that experiences 
have affective phenomenology in virtue of their intentional content. Their disagreement 
concerns what intentional content grounds affective phenomenology. To understand the nature 
of this disagreement and how it came about, we need to go back to the oldest intentionalist 
account of affective phenomenology, namely Tye’s original theory of the phenomenology of 
pain, which was neither evaluativist nor imperativist.  
 According to Tye (1995b), pain feels the way it does in virtue of representing the 
presence of damage in one’s body. In other words, the phenomenology of pain depends on 
pain’s representational-descriptive content. This content is representational because it represents 
one’s body as being a certain way; and it is descriptive because it doesn’t evaluate such a bodily 
condition: it merely describes it. However, it soon became clear that this wasn’t an account of 
the affective phenomenology of pain at all. At best, descriptive representationalism can explain 
why pain has sensory phenomenology, i.e., why, when in pain, you feel certain sensations as 
localised in your body. But why should your pain feel unpleasant simply in virtue of describing 
that your body is in such-and-such a state? (Aydede 2006).  
Faced with this problem, intentionalists parted ways. Evaluativists (Bain 2013, 2019; 
Carruthers 2018) retained the representationalist component of Tye’s proposal: experiences 
have affective phenomenology in virtue of representing things as being a certain way. But this 
representational content is evaluative rather than descriptive: it doesn’t merely describe how 
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things are; it evaluates them as good or bad. Accordingly, your backache doesn’t feel unpleasant 
in virtue of describing that your back is in such-and-such a condition. Rather, it feels so because 
it evaluates such a condition as bad. The point generalises. Why does your joy for having won the 







Imperativists (Barlassina & Hayward 2019; Martínez 2011; Klein 2015) adopted a 
different strategy. Representational content (whether descriptive or evaluative) is not the only 
type of intentional content. There is also a type of content that commands rather than 
represents: imperative content. As its name suggests, imperativism maintains that it is this non-
representational content that grounds the affective phenomenology of an experience. For 
example, Martínez (2011) proposes that your backache feels unpleasant because it commands 
you: Get less of this bodily damage! By the same token, your joy for having won the lottery feels 
pleasant in virtue of commanding you: Get more of these victories! We can also put it like this: for 
imperativism, affective experiences feel (un)pleasant not because they tell us how things are, but 
because they tell us to do something. 
 















2.2 World-directed vs experience-directed intentionalism 
So far, we have presented the debate among intentionalists in terms of the disagreement 
between evaluativism and imperativism. But there is another way to slice the intentionalist pie. 
Tye’s original descriptive representationalism is world-directed, or first-order: it maintains that the 
phenomenology of pain depends on pain representing the state of the non-mental world, in 
particular the condition of your body, as being such-and-such. Here again, evaluativists 
followed suit: affective experiences feel pleasant/unpleasant because they represent certain non-
mental, worldly objects as being good/bad (Bain 2013; Carruthers 2018). Your backache feels bad 
because it represents the condition of your back as bad. Many imperativists would agree with this. 
Martínez is a case in point. As we have seen, he thinks that your backache feels unpleasant in 






At least in principle, however, nothing prevents intentionalists from adopting an 
experience-directed view—that is, to propose that experiences have affective phenomenology in 
virtue of being directed at an experience. As far as we know, no evaluativist has ever taken this 
route.4 But imperativists have. Klein (2015) sketched a form of higher-order imperativism; we 
developed a form of reflexive, or same-order, imperativism (Barlassina and Hayward 2019). The 
 
4 Bain (2013, pp. 79-80) characterises dislike theories of pain (according to which pains are sensations 
that we dislike) as experience-directed evaluativist views. We think these are much better understood as 
experience-directed desire views, and that they should be rejected for the reasons that we gave above for 
rejecting desire theories in general.  
Intentionalism  
 




difference is as follows: for Klein, an experience E feels pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of 
commanding you: Get more/less of H!—where H is an experience numerically distinct from E. 
For reflexive imperativism, an experience instead feels pleasant or unpleasant in virtue of the 
fact that it commands its subject to get more or less of itself. In other words, affective 
phenomenology is grounded in reflexive commands: an experience E feels pleasant/unpleasant in 
virtue of commanding you: Get more/less of E! For example, your backache feels bad because it 









Accordingly, the intentionalist terrain can also be mapped as follows: world-directed 
theories, on the one hand, versus experience-directed theories, on the other. In this article, we 
discuss which of these two camps provides the best account of affective phenomenology. It goes 
without saying that we cannot discuss all forms of world-directed and experience-directed 
intentionalism about affective phenomenology. We shall rather compare and contrast two 
forms of world-directed intentionalism—i.e., world-directed evaluativism and world-directed 


















Our choice is well-motivated. First, nobody endorses world-directed descriptive 
representationalism about affective phenomenology anymore—even Tye is now a world-
directed evaluativist (Cutter & Tye 2011). In addition to world-directed evaluativism, the other 
main world-directed theory of affective phenomenology is world-directed imperativism. Hence 
our picks. As to experience-directed theories, we saw that there are two forms of experience-
directed imperativism: higher-order imperativism and reflexive imperativism. We have argued 
elsewhere (Barlassina & Hayward 2019) that reflexive imperativism should be preferred to 
higher-order imperativism. This is why we focus on the former—well, the fact that it is our 
theory also played a role in our choice. 
We have stated our aim already: we want to know whether there is a form of 
intentionalism that can provide an adequate theory of affective phenomenology, i.e., a theory 
that can satisfactorily answer questions (1)-(3). Now you also know how we are going to discover 
this: we will pit two varieties of world-directed intentionalism against one version of experience-
directed intentionalism. You can anticipate our verdict: neither world-directed evaluativism 
nor world-directed imperativism is up to the task. By contrast, reflexive imperativism offers a 
unified and principled account of (1)-(3). The only thing left us to do is to convince you that this 









3. The world is not enough 
In this section, we show that neither world-directed evaluativism (hereafter, WDE) nor world-
directed imperativism (hereafter, WDI) offers convincing answers to (1)-(3). Since WDE and 
WDI are by far the best versions of world-directed intentionalism yet proposed, this suggests 
that any theory of affective phenomenology couched in terms of world-directed intentional 
content is unlikely to succeed.  
 
3.1 Why affective phenomenology? 
Question (1) asks in virtue of what affective experiences have affective phenomenology. 
Intentionalists of any stripe will give an answer of the form: ‘Experience E is pleasant/unpleasant 
in virtue of having intentional content C+/C-’. Depending on what one takes ‘C+’ and ‘C-’ to 
stand for, one will obtain different, substantive intentionalist theories of affective phenomenology.  
How could one evaluate these theories? At the very least, they should be extensionally 
adequate: all pleasant/unpleasant experiences should have intentional content C+/C-; and all 
experiences with intentional content C+/C- should be pleasant/unpleasant. In what follows, 
we argue that neither WDE nor WDI satisfies this minimal requirement.    
 
3.1.1 Against necessity 
As you probably recall, WDE gives the following answer to (1): experience E is 
pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing some worldly object as good/bad. For example, 
Abe’s gustatory experience feels pleasant in virtue of possessing world-directed evaluative 
content: This brownie is good. In the case of WDI, the idea is instead this: experience E is 
pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of some worldly object. 
Abe’s gustatory experience, e.g., feels pleasant because it has world-directed imperative 
content: Get more of that brownie! 
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 There is a simple argument against the extensional adequacy of both WDE and WDI—
in fact, against any form of world-directed intentionalism. Some experiences of moods do not 
appear to have any world-directed (i.e., first-order) content at all: they are world-undirected 
(Mendelovici 2013). But they do have affective phenomenology. Thus, no world-directed 
content—be it imperative, evaluative, or whatever you want—can be necessary for affective 
phenomenology. Take misery as an example (elation would do as well). You wake up one day 
and you feel blue. This is clearly an experience with affective phenomenology: it feels terribly 
unpleasant. However, there is no worldly object that your experience evaluates as bad. And 
there is no worldly object that your experience commands you to act upon. This is because 
your experience isn’t directed at any worldly object at all.5  
This is instructive. World-directed intentionalism about affective phenomenology has 
been mainly developed to account for the unpleasantness of physical pain, with the affective 
phenomenology of other experiences left as an afterthought, on the assumption that a theory 
of pain’s unpleasantness can be readily extended to accommodate them. Now, physical pain 
does typically have a worldly object—one’s own body. But as soon as one tries to extend world-
directed intentionalism to cases like world-undirected moods, it becomes clear that it lacks the 
resources to account for affective phenomenology across the affective spectrum.  
 
3.1.2 Against sufficiency  
So, some experiences have affective phenomenology but lack imperative, or evaluative, world-
directed content. Conversely, it is also the case that some experiences have imperative, or 
 
5 Just to be clear, we are not saying that all moods are world-undirected. In fact, we don’t even think that 
all instances of misery/elation are that way. Our point is simply that some mood experiences—e.g., some 
instances of misery—lack world-directed content. This suffices to show that world-directed intentional 
content is not necessary for affective phenomenology.  
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evaluative, world-directed content, but lack affective phenomenology. Abe is hungry. His 
hunger feels unpleasant. It feels so—world-directed imperativism says—because it commands 
Abe: Get some food! Now, it is indeed plausible that Abe’s hunger has such a world-directed 
imperative content. In fact, it is plausible that all episodes of hunger have such a content. 
However, not all episodes of hungers feel unpleasant. Hence, world-directed imperative content 
is not sufficient for affective phenomenology.  
 The same issue carries over to evaluativism. Dr Expert and Dr Novice are looking at a 
patient’s severe injury. Dr Novice’s visual experience feels unpleasant. According to 
evaluativism, it feels so in virtue of possessing world-directed evaluative content: That injury is 
bad. If Dr Novice’s visual experience represents the patient’s injury as bad, so does Dr Expert’s. 
But Dr Expert is so used to these scenes that her visual experience doesn’t feel unpleasant. For 
her, it is just another day at work. Conclusion: it is false that if an experience has world-directed 
evaluative content, then it has affective phenomenology.6  
 
3.2 Motivational problems  
Recall our friend Abe: he was eating a brownie; his gustatory experience felt pleasant; this 
motivated him to get another bite; and so did he. Unfortunately, he is not always so lucky. The 
other day he opened a pack of shrimp. They were expired and smelled terrible. His disgust felt 
awfully unpleasant. This motivated him to throw the shrimps in the garbage. That’s exactly what 
he did.  
Question (2) asks in virtue of what affective phenomenology motivates us to act in these 
ways. WDI answers as follows. Affective phenomenology is grounded in world-directed 
imperative contents. These contents are intrinsically motivational: on their own, they motivate us 
 
6 Barlassina (under review) discusses a number of cases in which world-directed evaluative content and 
affective phenomenology come apart.  
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to change the state of the non-mental world—they thus count as world-directed motivations. But why 
did Abe act in these particular ways? He ate more of the brownie because the pleasantness of his 
experience reduced to the content Get more of this brownie!—a world-directed appetitive motivation. 
And he threw the shrimps away because the unpleasantness of his disgust consisted in the 
content Get less of these shrimps!—this time, a world-directed aversive motivation.  
WDE tells a similar story. Affective phenomenology is grounded in world-directed 
evaluative contents, and these contents are also intrinsically motivational. More precisely, 
pleasantness obtains in virtue of contents of the form O is good!, thus it has world-directed, 
appetitive motivational force; unpleasantness is instead grounded in contents of the form O is bad!, 
thus it has world-directed, aversive motivational force.  
We don’t find these stories the least convincing. In section 3.2.1, we raise a serious 
problem for the picture of motivation emerging from WDE; in 3.2.2, we show that WDI is 
immune to it; in 3.2.3, however, we argue that both WDE and WDI face a second 
insurmountable difficulty. 
 
3.2.1 The Thinking Otherwise Problem 
Let us say from the outset that we are somewhat sceptical of the claim made by WDE that 
evaluative contents are intrinsically motivational. This is because we subscribe to the Humean 
thesis that no purely representational content—be it descriptive or, as in the case of WDE, 
evaluative—can motivate on its own. However, evaluativists are well-aware of this worry (Bain 
2013) and, at least in this article, we are prepared to grant them this point. But this concession 
is not going to help WDE much. In fact, it raises two other issues. In this section, we discuss the 
first one, which we call the Thinking Otherwise Problem.  
Suppose that you have accidentally eaten one extremely hot Habanero pepper—you 
mistook it for a boring Sweet Bell pepper—and now your mouth is on fire. So, you run to the 
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fridge, pick a bottle of milk, and drink from it like there is no tomorrow. How does WDE 
explain your behaviour? Very simply, your unpleasant sensation had world-directed evaluative 
content There is a bad damage in my mouth and this evaluation motivated you to fix this 
(represented) damage. But there’s a complication. You are perfectly aware that the burning 
sensation resulting from eating hot food doesn’t correlate with any bodily damage. So, why did 
you chug all that milk if you knew full-well that the evaluation produced by your sensory system 
was false? (Of course, the problem need not be formulated in terms of knowledge. It is enough to 
imagine a case in which one has a belief—even a false belief—inconsistent with one’s “affective 
evaluation”.)  
Bain (2013, p. 84) considers a similar objection and responds by invoking the cognitive 
impenetrability of experiences. Just as a stick in water continues to visually appear bent even when 
the subject knows that it is straight, so the ‘Habanero pepper sensation’ continues to represent 
badness even when the subject knows that nothing bad is occurring. This response, however, 
won’t do. The Thinking Otherwise Problem doesn’t in fact concern why your sensory system 
continued to generate the evaluative content There is a bad damage in my mouth. Bain is right: the 
impenetrability of your sensory system can easily explain this. The problem is why you—better: 
your decision-making system (hereafter, DMS)—kept on taking this evaluative content at face 
value and acted upon it, irrespective of the fact that you knew it to be false. Let us explain.  
Your DMS is not cognitively impenetrable. Clearly, it can take the belief/knowledge 
that there is no damage in your mouth as input (this follows from the general thesis that your 
DMS can take any propositional attitude as input—it is an isotropic cognitive system, if there is 
one (Fodor 1983)). But then, in the light of this information, your DMS should have discounted 
the evaluation produced by your sensory system. Hence, the unpleasantness of your sensation 
shouldn’t have resulted in any action. But it did result in action! This indicates that, pace WDE, 
it is not the evaluation There is a bad damage in my mouth that explains the motivation created by 
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your unpleasant experience. If it did, your knowledge that there is no damage in your mouth 
should have prevented your unpleasant experience from steering your decision-making process.  
We can also put it like this. Your chugging the milk is explained by the unpleasantness 
of your experience. However, it could not be explained by a world-directed evaluation. Hence, 
it seems that WDE is false: affective phenomenology and world-directed evaluations are not 
one and the same thing.  
 
3.2.2 One cheer for world-directed imperativism 
WDI doesn’t face the Thinking Otherwise Problem. According to WDI, the unpleasantness of 
your ‘Habanero pepper sensation’ depends upon the world-directed imperative content Change 
the state of my mouth! In contrast to the evaluative content There is a bad damage in my mouth, this 
imperative content doesn’t represent your mouth as being badly damaged. Therefore, it is 
consistent with the belief that there is no damage in your mouth and cannot be countered by 
it. This is why your decision-making system (DMS) output the intention to drink milk even 
though it received the ‘no-damage belief’ as input: your DMS simply didn’t find any conflict 
between the content of this belief and the imperative content Change the state of my mouth! 
 Moreover, even if there were some sort of friction between contents such as Change the 
state of my mouth! and There is no damage in my mouth, WDI explains how such a conflict (if it exists!) 
can be won by the imperative. The reason is simple. According to WDI, only imperative 
contents are intrinsically motivational; representational contents (either descriptive or 
evaluative) aren’t. Thus, when the DMS has to decide whether to “obey” the imperative 
content Change the state of my mouth! or the content of the ‘no-damage belief’, there is no choice 
at all to be made: only the imperative content exerts a motivational pull over the DMS. This is 
why you are likely to swallow a litre of milk directly from the bottle no matter what your beliefs about 
your mouth’s condition are.  
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3.2.3 Hedo-motivational inversions  
WDI has an advantage over WDE: it escapes the Thinking Otherwise Problem. But that’s a 
trifling victory, since both theories face the same devastating objection.  
You are drinking instant coffee. It tastes awful. According to WDI, the unpleasantness of 
your experience is grounded in the world-directed imperative content Get less of this coffee!, and 
must then motivate you to stop drinking coffee—a world-directed aversive motivation. By the 
same token, had your experience been pleasant, it would have had content Get more of this coffee!, 
and should thus have motivated you to keep on drinking coffee—this time, a world-directed 
appetitive motivation.   
As we know, the picture emerging from WDE is basically the same. Pleasant 
experiences have world-directed evaluative content This object is good; such a content has 
intrinsic, world-directed, appetitive motivational force; hence, pleasant experiences cannot but 
motivate you to get more of their worldly objects. Unpleasant experiences have instead world-
directed evaluative content This object is bad; such a content has intrinsic, world-directed, aversive 
motivational; hence, unpleasant experiences cannot but motivate you to get less of their worldly 
objects.  
 Now, we are happy to grant DWI and DWE that there is a reliable connection between 
pleasantness/unpleasantness and world-directed appetitive/aversive motivations. However, 
this connection is not as intimate as these two theories predict. On many occasions, the 
connection breaks down and one either has (i) a pleasant experience accompanied by a world-
directed aversive motivation for the experience’s worldly object, or (ii) an unpleasant experience 
accompanied by a world-directed appetitive motivation for the experience’s worldly object. How 
do we know that such hedo-motivational inversions occur?7   
 
7 Please notice that even weaker dissociations would suffice to put these two theories in a lot of trouble: 
cases in which an intervention that increases/decreases the level of pleasantness or unpleasantness of an 
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A rat’s tale 
A first source of evidence comes from Kent Berridge and colleagues’ celebrated work on the 
neuroscience of liking (i.e., affective phenomenology) vs wanting (i.e., world-directed 
motivation)—Berridge (1996) is perhaps the locus classicus. Even a couple of Berridge et al.’s 
findings are enough to drive world-directed intentionalists to despair.  
Facial expressions are a well-established measure of taste-elicited (un)pleasantness in 
many species (including, of course, human beings) (Berridge, 2000). For example, rats respond 
to unpleasant stimuli with gapes and head shakes, and to pleasant ones with tongue protrusions. 
World-directed motivation can instead be assessed through the individual’s object-oriented 
behaviour: appetitive behaviours towards object O (e.g., approaching, ingesting, licking O) 
indicate appetitive motivations for O; O-aversive behaviours indicate aversive motivations. 
Bilateral damage to the central nucleus of the amygdala abolishes salt intake in rats: 
even though these rats display normal water and food consumption, they reject solutions 
containing more than 0.2% NaCl, thus exhibiting a clear aversive motivation for salt (Flynn et al. 
1991). However, their facial expressions strongly indicate that they experience pleasure in 
response to salty stimuli (Galaverna et al. 1993). This in an instance of hedo-motivational 
inversion (i): a pleasant experience accompanied by a world-directed aversive motivation for the 
experience’s worldly object.  
 
experience does not increase/decrease the intensity of the experience’s world-directed appetitive or aversive 
motivational force (or vice versa). Even though one can find plenty of these weak dissociations in the 
neuroscientific literature (see Berridge et al. 2009 for a review), we shall not discuss them here, because 
they would force us to introduce a further level of complexity in our analysis of world-directed 
intentionalism, namely, the idea that both the level of (un)pleasantness of an affective experience E and 
the intensity of E’s world-directed motivational force are grounded in the strength of E’s world-directed 
imperative/evaluative content.  
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And here is an example of hedo-motivational inversion (ii)—(Berridge and Valenstein 
1991). Electrical stimulation of the lateral hypothalamus (ESLH) considerably increases feeding 
behaviour in rats and other animals, thus indicating the presence of a strong appetitive motivation 
for food. However, ESLH doesn’t parallelly potentiate pleasantness in response to food. Quite 




But one doesn’t need to go into the lab to find examples of hedo-motivational inversions. One 
of the authors of this paper often finds himself in the following situation: he opens a pack of 
crisps; he starts munching them; the resulting experience is disgusting; but he keeps on 
munching at full speed. His gustatory experience is thus deeply unpleasant, yet, at the same time, 
it is accompanied by the appetitive motivation to keep on consuming the junk food in question. 
Therefore, it cannot be the case that his experience is unpleasant in virtue of possessing 
imperative content Get less of that food! or evaluative content This food is bad, if, as WDI and WDE 
say, these contents are intrinsically motivational. 
 
3.3 Out of the loop  
Now, we come to question (3): in virtue of what does affective phenomenology have a loopy 
regulatory profile? Eating the brownie brings about a gustatory experience in Abe. Why does 
the pleasantness of this experience make Abe acting in a way that results in more gustatory pleasure?  
Here again, WDE and WDI answer in a similar fashion. Abe’s gustatory experience has 
either world-directed evaluative content This brownie is good, or world-directed imperative 
content Get more of this brownie! Either content has intrinsic, world-directed, appetitive motivational 
force, hence motivates Abe to eat more of the brownie. This action, in turn, causes another 
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pleasant gustatory experience in Abe, which then motivates him to get yet another bite, and so on. 
In other words, world-directed intentionalism sketches the following picture of affective 
phenomenology’s loopy motivational profile:  
 
a) something (say, your drinking a coffee) causes a certain affective experience in a subject 
(e.g., you undergo a pleasant, or unpleasant, experience);  
b) in virtue of its world-directed imperative/evaluative content, this experience 
intrinsically motivates its subject to get more, or less, of its worldly object (e.g., it motivates 
you to drink again, or to stop drinking, your coffee);  
c) all else being equal, this motivation results in a corresponding action (e.g., you get 
another sip of your coffee, or you refrain from doing so);  
d) this action typically brings about a change in the subject’s affective experience (e.g., you 







We have a major misgiving about this model: it is silent about the numerous cases in which 
our affect-changing actions cannot be explained in terms of affective experiences’ world-
directed intentional contents. One such case is Zoe’s, which we recounted at the very beginning 
of this article: she sprained her right ankle; her experience felt unpleasant; she thus took a 
painkiller and her unpleasant pain went away. It should be obvious why this case escapes the 
explanatory net casted by world-directed intentionalism. The latter has it that Zoe’s pain is 
 
Affective experience 
Pleasant: O is good/More of O! 
Unpleasant: O is bad/Less of O! 
World-directed 
motivation 
Pleasure: Approach O! 
Displeasure: Avoid O! 
Action 
S gets O 
S gets rid of O 
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unpleasant in virtue of having world-directed content There is a bad damage in my right ankle/Get 
rid of the damage in my right ankle! But unless Zoe literally knows nothing about the human body, 
such a content cannot motivate her to take a painkiller, since painkillers soothe one’s unpleasant 
pain without fixing the bodily damage. If we want to explain Zoe’s behaviour, we should rather 
attribute her an experience-directed motivation: she took a painkiller because she wanted to get rid 
of her unpleasant pain. Our challenge for world-directed intentionalism is to explain where such 
a motivation comes from.  
The challenge can also be introduced by again considering the case of world-undirected 
moods we discussed in section 3.1.1 Misery, we said, doesn’t have any world-directed intentional 
content, hence it lacks world-directed motivational force. But this doesn’t mean that it is not 
associated to any motivation whatsoever. Quite the contrary, when one experiences this 
unpleasant mood, one doesn’t want to feel that way. The same carries over, mutatis mutandis, to 
elation: this pleasant mood is associated to an experience-directed motivation—one wants to 
feel more of this pleasant mood—even though it doesn’t have world-directed motivational force.8 
In fact, it takes only a moment’s reflection to realise that this is a general truth about 
affective experiences: pleasant experiences are such that, when we experience them, we want 
to have more of them; unpleasant experiences are such that, when we experience them, we want 
to have less of them. Hence our question for world-directed intentionalism: in virtue of what are 
affective experiences regularly associated with motivations pro, or against, them? 
We now consider how proponents of WDI (Section 3.3.1) and proponents of WDE 
(Section 3.3.2) have attempted to answer this question, and we show that neither attempt works.  
 
 
8 As a matter of fact, this counts as yet another type of dissociation between pleasantness/unpleasantness 
and world-directed appetitive/aversive motivational force. We don’t elaborate on this point further 
because we have the impression that our take-down of world-directed intentionalism is already too cruel.  
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3.3.1 Spammy requests  
Here is a natural answer to our question: it is the very nature of our affective experiences that 
makes us want having more/less of them. We are motivated against them because they feel 
unpleasant; and we are motivated towards them because they feel pleasant. The pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the experiences makes sense of our desire to have, or to avoid, them. 
Unfortunately, this natural answer is not available to WDI. For this theory, the 
pleasantness/unpleasantness of an experience E is nothing over and above E’s commanding us 
to have more/less of a certain worldly object. But, clearly, this command cannot make sense of 
our attitudes towards E itself. For example, the fact that Zoe’s unpleasant pain has world-directed 
imperative content Get rid of the damage in my right ankle! entirely fails to rationalise Zoe’s negative 
attitude towards her pain—it can only rationalise Zoe’s aversion for her bodily damage.  
Martínez (2015) concedes this point and attempts to explain experience-directed 
motivations not in terms of affective experiences’ content, but in terms of their functional role. 
Affective experiences are, qua world-directed imperatival states, demanding and distracting: 
they issue commands and, in this way, capture our attention and re-order our world-directed 
motivational preferences. For example, Zoe’s unpleasant pain insists on telling her Get rid of the 
damage in my right ankle!, thus not letting Zoe attending to anything else. Now, this is perfectly 
functional on many occasions: if your right ankle is seriously damaged, then you’d better interrupt 
whatever it is that you are doing and focus on fixing your ankle. But not all occasions are like that. 
Suppose that Zoe has done everything in her power to obey the command Get rid of the damage 
in my ankle! At this point, such a command has become “spammy”—it has lost any beneficial 
function. Luckily, the human mind has the “general tendency to display avoidant reactions to 
insistent, unfulfillable, misguided, or otherwise inconvenient requests” (Martínez 2015, p. 
2270). It is because of this hard-wired response to spammy commands, Martínez says, that Zoe forms 
the motivation to stop the pain experience by taking a painkiller.  
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Lets’ be honest: Martínez’s proposal is utterly unbelievable. How could one say with a 
straight face that the unpleasantness of our pains has nothing to do with our decisions to soothe them 
through painkillers? But beyond its sheer implausibility, Martinez’s account faces a dilemma as 
well. According to him, we desire not to have an unpleasant pain only when it has become 
spammy, and an experience is spammy only when there is no (further) action we can take to fulfil 
the world-directed command issued by it. The obvious problem with this is that we desire to 
end our unpleasant pains even when there are lots of actions open to us to alleviate our bodily 
damages. Consider Zoe. She has just injured her ankle, thus there are many options open to her to 
fix her body: she can massage her leg; go to the doctor; put ice on her ankle; and so forth. It 
follows that the command Get rid of the damage in my right ankle! issued by her unpleasant pain 
doesn’t count as spammy according to Martínez own’s standards. Still, Zoe is motivated against 
her unpleasant pain: she doesn’t want to feel like that!  
 In response to this objection, Martinez might redefine ‘spamminess’, so that any insistent 
and distracting command counts as spammy, whether or not it is unfulfillable or has gone on for 
a long time. That would make sense of the immediacy of our aversion to being in unpleasant 
pain. But this takes us to the other horn of the dilemma: it predicts that the more an experience 
is pleasant, the more we are motivated against it! You are having an orgasm. Your experience 
feels extremely pleasant. WDI explains such an affective phenomenology by saying that your 
experience has world-directed imperative content: Get more of the stimulations of my genitals! Now, 
this is an insistent and distracting command if there is one—try to do anything else while 
orgasming!—but we want of course to have more of such an experience, not less of it. And why so? 
The answer is simple: because it feels extremely pleasant. But, as we know, this is not something 





3.3.2 Background desires 
In a sense, WDE is exactly in the same predicament as WDI: since unpleasantness/pleasantness 
is identical to world-directed evaluations, it cannot per se generate experience-directed 
motivations. For example, the unpleasantness of Zoe’s pain is constituted by the evaluation 
There is a bad damage in my right ankle, and thus can only motivate her to fix the condition of her 
ankle. So why do we desire our pleasant/unpleasant experience to continue/end? Here is the 
answer given by Bain (2019, p. 485): we are motivated for/against our pleasant/unpleasant 
experiences because these experiences are good/bad for us, and we have background desires to 
have/not to have things occur which are good/bad for us. 
What should we make of Bain’s proposal? Now, even though we said earlier that a 
theory of affective phenomenology shouldn’t rest on normative commitments of this kind, we 
can grant to Bain that we do have background desires for/against things that are good/bad for 
us. The question now becomes whether having a pleasant/unpleasant experience really is 
good/bad for us. Clearly, Bain owes us an argument to this effect. As it turns out, he has one, 
but we are going to show that it faces a dilemma: either it fails to support its conclusion, or it 
forces Bain to give up intentionalism.  
Bain often gives the following intuitive argument for the claim that pleasant/unpleasant 
experiences are good/bad for us: they are so because experiencing a pleasant/unpleasant feeling is 
good/bad for us (Bain 2019, p. 482). Regardless of whether one finds this convincing or not (as 
a matter of fact, we don’t), this argument is not available to Bain qua intentionalist. For a theory 
to count as genuinely intentionalist, its explanations should entirely take place at the semantic-
intentional level. That is, intentionalists are supposed to reduce phenomenology to intentional 
content and then produce an explanation by exclusively adverting to the reducing content, with 
phenomenology playing no independent explanatory role. Bain’s intuitive argument does not 
respect this stricture, since it is rests entirely on how affective experiences feel, without any 
28 
 
deeper explanation. Bain should rather show us that being in an intentional state that evaluates 
things as good/bad is good/bad for us. Could he come up with such an argument?  
Sometimes, Bain seems to argue that merely tokening a mental state with 
positive/negative evaluative content is good/bad for somebody, and hence that we are 
motivated to token/not to token these states (Bain 2019). But this is clearly false. We believe 
that jumping off a cliff would be terribly bad for us, but we don’t think that this belief is bad for us. 
Quite the contrary, we think that we are very lucky to have such a belief, and we are not at all 
motivated to get rid of it—God forbid! 
In fact, even Bain seems to reluctantly accept this, since he is at pain to highlight that 
there is something distinctive about tokening evaluative experiences: when we have such 
experiences, the properties goodness/badness are “encountered” in some special way, a way that 
rationalises our desires for/against these experiences (Bain 2019, pp. 484-485). We are not sure 
we understand Bain’s suggestion, but this is not a big problem, since it fails to count as an 
intentionalist explanation yet again. Remember: an intentionalist explanation should only be 
based on a mental state’s content. However, the belief This is bad for me and the experience This 
is bad for me have exactly the same content. Thus, given intentionalism, it cannot be the case that 
the latter, but not the former, rationalises our desires against it.  
 
3.4 Taking stock 
In this section, we highlighted that the answers given to (1)-(3) by world-directed intentionalism 
generate the following problems:  
 
(i) Neither WDE nor WDI is extensionally adequate: there are affective experiences 
lacking world-directed imperative/evaluative content, and there are experiences 
possessing such a content but devoid of affective phenomenology.  
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(ii) WDE faces the Thinking Otherwise Problem: it cannot explain why affect-based 
decisions are not influenced by our knowledge and beliefs.  
(iii) Neither WDE nor WDI has the resources to account for hedo-motivational 
inversions.  
(iv) Neither WDE nor WDI can explain why we have experience-directed motivations: 
why we want more/less of our pleasant/unpleasant experiences.  
 




4. The importance of being reflexive 
The structure of this final section is as simple as it gets. We detail reflexive imperativism 
(Barlassina & Hayward 2019) by considering how it answers questions (1)-(3) in turn. By doing 
so, we both highlight reflexive imperativism’s explanatory power as well as its capacity to evade 
problems (i)-(iv). The conclusion will not surprise you: we have to favour reflexive imperativism 
over world-directed intentionalism.  
 
4.1 On the grounds of affective phenomenology 
4.1.1 The basic idea 
Question (1) asks in virtue of what an experience has affective phenomenology. Reflexive 
imperativism is a form of experience-directed intentionalism: it says that an experience has 
affective phenomenology in virtue of possessing experience-directed, rather than world-directed, 
intentional content. More precisely, reflexive imperativism has it that affective phenomenology 
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depends on imperative contents that command the subject of the experience to do something about 
some experience. What experience exactly?  
It is here that the reflexive aspect kicks in: an experience E has affective phenomenology 
in virtue of possessing a content that commands one to do something about E itself. In 
particular, an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of possessing reflexive imperative content 
(1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of possessing reflexive imperative content 
(2):9 
 
(1) More of P! 
(2) Less of U! 
 
For example, Abe’s gustatory experience G feels pleasant because it has reflexive imperative 
content More of G!, while Zoe’s pain is unpleasant because it commands her Less of this experience!  
If you need to condense all this into a memorable sentence, here is one for you: affective 
experiences feel pleasant/unpleasant because they command us More of me!/Less of me! (bumper 
stickers are coming soon). This is how reflexive imperativism answers question (1).  
This account of the grounds of affective phenomenology is, we maintain, extensionally 
adequate: all pleasant/unpleasant experiences E have intentional content More of E!/Less of E!; 
and all experiences E with intentional content More of E!/Less of E! are pleasant/unpleasant. 
But we are not so foolish as to try to prove these two universally quantified statements by 
exhaustion. In the next section, we shall rather content ourselves with showing that reflexive 
imperativism succeeds vis-à-vis extensional adequacy where world-directed intentionalism fails, 
 
9 See Barlassina and Hayward (2019) for a discussion of the syntactic structure of affective experiences.  
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and we leave to you, the reader, the task to devise counterexamples against it. Our bet is that 
you are not going to find any.  
 
4.1.2 Extensional adequacy, or: hunger, doctors, and misery  
World-directed imperativism (WDI) is committed to the claim that if an experience has world-
directed imperative content, then it has affective phenomenology. Hunger, we said in section 
3.1.2, shows this to be false. While it is plausible that all episodes of hunger command something 
like Get some food!, it is clearly not the case that all episodes of hunger have affective 
phenomenology—some of them feel in fact neither pleasant nor unpleasant.  
 Reflexive imperativism neatly solves the problem. Even though it might well be the case 
that all episodes of hunger have world-directed imperative content Get some food!, this content 
has nothing to do with affective phenomenology. Rather, affective phenomenology obtains in 
virtue of reflexive imperative content. Hence, those episodes of hunger that have world-directed 
imperative content Get some food!, but lack reflexive imperative content, will thereby lack 
affective phenomenology. On the contrary, if one has an episode of hunger that, in addition to 
commanding Get some food!, also commands Less of this command!, one has an experience of 
unpleasant hunger.  
 In section 3.1.2, we raised a similar worry for world-directed evaluativism (WDE). Dr 
Novice is looking at a patient’s severe injury. What a terrible sight! According to WDE, this 
visual experience feels unpleasant because it has world-directed evaluative content That injury is 
bad. But this cannot be right. If Dr Novice’s visual experience represents the patient’s injury as 
bad, so does Dr Expert’s; but the latter is not undergoing any unpleasant visual experience—
Dr Expert is just too used to this kind of stuff to be bothered. 
Here comes reflexive imperativism with the right treatment. Dr Novice and Dr Expert’s 
visual experiences have the same world-directed content. However, while Dr Novice’s 
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experience also has reflexive imperative content Less of this visual experience!, Dr Expert’s visual 
experience has lost this layer of content—probably due to desensitisation. This is why Dr 
Novice’s experience feels unpleasant, while Dr Expert’s feels “affectively neutral”.  
Finally, in section 3.1.1, we argued that mood episodes like misery and elation put both 
WDI and WDE in trouble, since they have affective phenomenology, but need not have world-
directed content. It is cases like these that make reflexive imperativism’s explanatory power 
stands out.  
Affective experiences—reflexive imperativism says—have affective phenomenology 
because they have reflexive imperative content. In the great majority of cases, affective 
experiences don’t have this type of content only. For example, unpleasant hunger also has world-
directed imperative content Get some food!, and a pleasant taste experience of an ice-cream also 
has world-directed descriptive content This food is sugary. The interesting thing is that, on some 
rare occasions, an affective experience can lack all non-reflexive content and be nothing more 
than a bare reflexive command. World-undirected moods are a case in point. When one 
experiences pure misery, one tokens a mental state whose only content is Less of me! This explains 
why pure misery is experienced as pure unpleasantness: because unpleasantness is nothing over 
and above the reflexive command Less of me!, and this command is all that there is when it comes 
to pure misery.  
 
4.2 How to get motivated  
4.2.1 On the relation between experience-directed and world-directed motivations 
Let’s now turn to question (2), which concerns the regulative power of affective 
phenomenology: in virtue of what does this phenomenology typically motivate us to act a 
certain way?  
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With regard to motivation, the crucial difference between world-directed intentionalism 
and reflexive imperativism is this: for the former, affective phenomenology has world-directed 
motivational force; for the latter, it has experience-directed motivational force—our affective 
experiences don’t motivate us for, or against, some worldly object; they motivate us for, or 
against, themselves. Think again about Abe eating his brownie. According to world-directed 
intentionalism, his gustatory experience feels pleasant in virtue of telling him: This brownie is 
good/Get more of this brownie!, thus motivating him to get more of the brownie. For reflexive 
imperativism, it instead feels so because it commands Abe: More of this experience! Thus, the 
pleasantness of Abe’s experience motivates him to obtain more of that experience, rather than 
more of the brownie.  
But then why does Abe, in response to this experience-directed motivation, get another 
bite from the brownie? Because his decision-making system computes that the best way to satisfy 
this experience-direct motivation is to keep on eating the brownie. Let us explain. Affective 
experiences don’t come out of nowhere. Sometimes, we can generate/suppress/modify them 
by performing mental actions. For example, we can obtain some pleasure by imagining having a 
certain experience, or we can somehow reduce the unpleasantness of our pain by focusing on 
something else. But these mental actions are of limited use. If you want to have more/less of an 
affective experience, the most effective strategy typically consists of performing a non-mental 
action, i.e., it consists of acting upon the world a certain way. Abe figured that out: eating the 
brownie brought about a pleasant experience P in him; P had imperative content More of P!, 
and thus had experience-directed motivational force; Abe realised that the best way to satisfy this 
pro-P motivation was to eat more of the brownie; on this basis, he formed the world-directed 
motivation to eat the brownie and acted accordingly. If Abe is particularly smart and self-
controlled, he will savour the brownie, eating it slowly in order to get the maximum quantity 
of pleasant gustatory experience from it.  
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Reflexive imperativism thus doesn’t deny that affective phenomenology often causes 
world-directed motivations. The point is rather that these motivations are not intrinsic to affective 
phenomenology. It is instead experience-directed motivation that is intrinsic to affective 
phenomenology. When one undergoes a pleasant/unpleasant experience, one undergoes an 
experience issuing the command More of me!/Less of me!, hence one is motivated for/against 
one’s affective experience. It is only through decision-making that such an experience-directed 
motivation might bring about a world-directed motivation.  
Why should you believe this story? Because it solves all the motivation-related problems 
faced by WDE and WDI.  
 
4.2.2 Problem solving  
For WDE, when you have a pleasant/unpleasant experience, you have an experience that 
evaluates its worldly object O as good/bad, and thus motivates you for/against O. As we have 
seen in section 3.2.1, one main issue with this proposal is that it predicts that your beliefs about 
the value of O should significantly influence your decision-making process, but this doesn’t 
happen. For example, when you eat a hot Habanero pepper, you might know full-well that you 
are not undergoing any bad bodily damage; still, on the basis of the unpleasantness of your 
experience, you do things like chugging milk directly from the bottle. Conclusion: the 
unpleasantness of your experience is not grounded in the evaluation There is a bad damage in my 
mouth. If it were, your knowledge that this evaluation is false should have prevented you from 
acting like that.  
 This was the Thinking Otherwise Problem for WDE, and here is how reflexive 
imperativism (dis)solves it. Affective phenomenology obtains in virtue of reflexive imperative 
content. For example, the unpleasantness of your ‘Habanero pepper sensation’ is due to the 
content Less of this sensation! When this content is sent to your decision-making system, it is not 
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discounted in the light of information concerning the condition of your mouth. The reason is 
simple: this content has nothing to do with how your mouth is faring, and thus information 
about that doesn’t have any bearing on it. You drink milk because you know it will lessen the 
sensation, even though you don’t believe that it will do anything to change the physical 
condition of your mouth. 
 More importantly, reflexive imperativism has the explanatory resources to account for 
dissociations between affective phenomenology and world-directed motivation. One such 
dissociation occurs in the case of a mood like misery, which is clearly unpleasant but need not 
have world-directed motivational force. This is a mystery for world-directed intentionalism. 
After all, if (i) affective phenomenology obtains in virtue of world-directed 
evaluative/imperative contents and (ii) such contents are intrinsically motivational, then the 
unpleasantness of misery must give rise to some world-directed motivation. But it often doesn’t. 
When feeling blue, you are motivated not to feel like that, that’s true. But you might not experience 
any world-directed motivation. 
 Here’s how reflexive imperativism accounts for this phenomenon. First, misery—qua 
unpleasant affective experience—has reflexive imperative content Less of me!, and so motivates 
you against itself. This explains the fact that when feeling miserable, you don’t want to feel like 
that. Second, reflexive imperativism has it that an experience-directed motivation, ME, brings 
about a world-directed motivation, Mw, only when the decision-making system takes Mw to 
be a way of satisfying ME. E.g., if your decision-making system hadn’t hypothesized that 
drinking milk would have stopped your ‘Habanero pepper sensation’, your motivation against 
that sensation wouldn’t have resulted in the motivation to drink milk.   
But, of course, the decision-making system might fail to individuate a course of non-
mental action that can satisfy the inputted experience-directed motivation. In such a case, the 
experience-directed motivation doesn’t cause any world-directed motivation. This—or 
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something close enough—is what happens with misery. The command Less of this experience! 
enters the decision-making system, but the latter is not sure as to how accommodate this 
request. As is so often the case, it is unclear whether any non-mental action will lessen the 
misery. At the beginning, the decision-making system might initiate some experimental 
behavioural strategies, in order to see if they result in a reduction of the command Less of this 
experience! After discovering that they are unsuccessful, the decision-making system gives up. 
Result: one feels miserable; one doesn’t want to feel like that; but one doesn’t have any world-
directed motivation associated to one’s affective experience. 
Another relevant type of dissociation is what we called hedo-motivational inversions (section 
3.2.3): cases where a pleasant experience is associated to a world-directed aversive motivation; or 
where an unpleasant experience is associated to a world-directed appetitive motivation. We have 
simply no idea how world-directed intentionalism can make sense of this phenomenon. If 
pleasure obtains in virtue of contents like O is good/Get more of O!, then it must have O-appetitive 
motivational force; and if displeasure obtains in virtue of contents like O is bad/Get less of O!, 
then it must have O-aversive motivational force.  
How does reflexive imperativism fare in this regard? As you know, the theory proposes 
that experience-directed motivations and world-directed motivations are normally causally 
harnessed as follows: (i) one undergoes a pleasant/unpleasant experience, which possesses 
experience-directed motivational force; (ii) this motivation is sent to the decision-making 
system, which attempts to compute the best way to satisfy it; (iii) if this computational process 
results in the individuation of a certain non-mental action, then a corresponding world-directed 
motivation obtains. The important thing about this causal structure is that it makes it possible 
to manipulate world-directed motivations without manipulating experience-directed motivations. This, 
we maintain, is exactly what happens in Berridge et al.’s experiments. We will show this by 
discussing the case of amygdala-damaged rats (Flynn et al. 1991; Galaverna et al. 1993).  
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As you might remember, those rats find salt pleasurable. According to reflexive 
imperativism, this means that they want more of that experience. Strikingly, however, this 
experience-directed motivation doesn’t bring about the world-directed motivation to ingest salt: 
these rats in fact constantly refuse salty food. How’s that possible? Very simply, interventions 
to the central nucleus of the amygdala directly control the rat’s world-directed motivations, 
causing the production of the prepotent, world-directed motivational signal Don’t eat salt! Here 
is another way to put it. Berridge and colleagues disrupted the normal causal chain going from 
the experience-directed motivation More of this experience! to the world-directed motivation Eat 
some salt! Typically, when the rat’s decision-making system gets the first motivation as input, it 
produces the second motivation as output. Through experimental manipulation of the 
amygdala, however, the rat’s decision-making system has been set up to constantly output the 
motivation not to eat any salt, regardless of the experience-directed motivation it receives as input.  
In this section, we sketched some models that attempt to explain why some affective 
experiences, like misery, don’t have any world-directed motivational force, and why some others 
feel pleasant/unpleasant but are associated to world-aversive/world-appetitive motivations—the so-
called hedo-motivational inversions. Please notice that, given our present purposes, it doesn’t 
matter much if our models get the details right—this is something that would require an article 
of its own. The central point is rather this. For reflexive imperativism, there is a considerable 
degree of independence between affective phenomenology and world-directed motivation, and 
this makes it possible that the typical causal relation between them goes awry. On the contrary, 
world-directed intentionalism ties the two so closely that it is almost impossible to see how they 






4.3 Staying in the loop 
Last, but not least, let’s see how reflexive imperativism captures affective phenomenology’s loopy 
regulatory profile, i.e., how it explains why the actions motivated by the affective phenomenology 
of our experiences end up regulating these very experiences back—this was our question (3). 
Again, the best way to introduce the answer given by reflexive imperativism is to contrast it 
with the one put forward by world-directed intentionalism.  
 For the latter, affective phenomenology’s loopy regulatory profile does not depend on 
the nature of this phenomenology. In fact, such a phenomenology only motivates one to get 
more/less of a certain worldly object. For example, the pleasantness of Abe’s gustatory experience 
at time t obtains in virtue of world-directed content The brownie is good/Get more of the brownie!, 
thus merely motivates him to eat more of the brownie at time t+1. Eating a brownie, however, 
reliably brings about pleasant gustatory experiences. It is in virtue of this reliable causal relation that 
Abe’s gustatory pleasure at time t results in Abe’s getting more gustatory pleasure at time t+2.  
 In section 3.3, we argued that this proposal fails to account for those cases in which 
affect-changing actions are not grounded in world-directed motivations. Consider Zoe. She 
sprained her right ankle; she experiences unpleasant pain; she thus takes a painkiller; her 
unpleasant pain goes away. We cannot explain this regulatory loop in the following way: (i) Zoe’s 
unpleasant pain has content There is a bad bodily damage in my right ankle/Get rid of the bodily damage 
in my right ankle!, thus motivates Zoe to fix the bodily damage in her right ankle; (ii) upon 
receiving this world-directed motivation as input, Zoe’s decision-making system generates the 
motivation to take a painkiller as output; (iii) by taking the painkiller, Zoe gets rid of her 
unpleasant pain.  
Clearly, there is something wrong with (ii): unless Zoe is really in the dark about how 
painkillers work, she will not form the motivation to take a painkiller on the basis of the world-
directed motivation to fix her right ankle. The only way to explain Zoe’s decision to take a 
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painkiller is to credit her with an experience-directed motivation: Zoe decided to take a 
painkiller because she didn’t want to feel unpleasant pain. But where did this experience-directed 
motivation come from? We argued above that world-directed intentionalism fails to answer this 
crucial question.  
 Reflexive imperativism has instead a very convincing answer: Zoe doesn’t want to feel 
unpleasant pain because her unpleasant pain experience has reflexive content Less of this 
experience! This also explains why Zoe’s affective phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile. 
This phenomenology commands Less of this experience! Upon receiving this experience-directed 
command as input, Zoe’s decision-making system generates the motivation to take a painkiller 
as output. Zoe then takes the painkiller and her unpleasant pain goes away.  
The same type of explanation applies to all instances of affect-based regulatory loops. 
Let’s go back to Abe. The pleasantness of his gustatory experience has content More of this 
experience! Abe believes that, by eating more of the brownie, he will satisfy such an experience-
directed motivation. Thus, he acts accordingly and gets more gustatory pleasure.  
The  general structure is always the same: (A) S has a pleasant/unpleasant experience 
E; (B) E’s affective phenomenology motivates S for/against E itself; (C) S’s decision-making 
attempts to compute the best course of non-mental action to satisfy this experience-directed 
motivation; (D) if an appropriate course of non-mental action is individuated, S ceteris paribus 
acts that way and gets more/less of the relevant experience. Hence the regulatory loop. It is 




So how does affective phenomenology regulate? According to world-directed intentionalism, 
affective phenomenology motivates us to approach or avoid certain worldly objects, and these 
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world-directed motivations happen to bring about more or less of our affective experiences as a side 
effect.  
Reflexive imperativism understands the loopy regulatory profile of affective 
phenomenology in a precisely inverse manner. What affective experiences fundamentally tell 
us to do is to regulate them. A pleasant experience P has reflexive imperative content More of P!, 
and thus motivates us to have more of itself; an unpleasant experience U has reflexive 
imperative content Less of U!, and thus motivates us to have less of itself. Since most often the 
best way to satisfy an experience-directed motivation is to perform a non-mental action (to eat a 
brownie, take a painkiller, or drink soothing milk), affective phenomenology typically brings 
about world-directed motivations as well. But these world-directed motivations are ultimately 
in the service of the experience-directed motivations that caused them. When we act under the 
sway of affective phenomenology, our end goal is that of getting more/less of our affective 
experience.  
 In this article, we argued that there are many reasons to prefer reflexive imperativism 
to world-directed intentionalism. The former, but not the latter, is extensionally adequate, 
solves the Thinking Otherwise Problem, has the resources to deal with world-undirected 
moods, and accounts for hedo-motivational inversions. Reflexive imperativism is the best 
intentionalist account of affective phenomenology—probably, the best account tout court. “More 
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